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Summary
Humans develop richmental representations that guide their
behavior in a variety of everyday tasks. However, it is un-
known whether these representations, often formalized as
priors in Bayesian inference, are specific for each task or
subserve multiple tasks. Current approaches cannot distin-
guish between these two possibilities because they cannot
extract comparable representations across different tasks
[1–10]. Here, we develop a novel method, termed cognitive
tomography, that can extract complex, multidimensional
priors across tasks. We apply this method to human judg-
ments in two qualitatively different tasks, ‘‘familiarity’’ and
‘‘odd one out,’’ involving an ecologically relevant set of stim-
uli, human faces. We show that priors over faces are struc-
turally complex and vary dramatically across subjects, but
are invariant across the taskswithin each subject. The priors
we extract from each task allow us to predict with high preci-
sion the behavior of subjects for novel stimuli both in the
same task as well as in the other task. Our results provide
the first evidence for a single high-dimensional structured
representation of a naturalistic stimulus set that guides
behavior in multiple tasks. Moreover, the representations
estimated by cognitive tomography can provide indepen-
dent, behavior-based regressors for elucidating the neural
correlates of complex naturalistic priors.
Results
Human performance in a wide range of individual perceptual
tasks has been shown to be close to that of an ideal observer
that combines sensory evidence with prior expectations ac-
cording to the rules of Bayesian inference [11]. Moreover,
many perceptual illusions have been shown to arise from the
influence of priors in the face of sensory uncertainty or ambi-
guity [12]. Thus, characterizing priors for natural stimuli and
understanding how they are used is central to the study of hu-
man perception.
The priors we use for simple one-dimensional variables,
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are credited.of sunlight [13], have each been carefully characterized in the
context of a specific perceptual task. However, surprisingly
little is known about the nature of priors for complex, high-
dimensional real-life stimuli, such as faces, and whether
such priors depend on the task in which they are employed.
The task dependence of priors, in particular, addresses a
fundamental assumption of the Bayesian paradigm that has
so far gone untested: to allow for efficient learning and power-
ful generalization, natural priors should be shared across tasks
such that the same prior can be used in many different situa-
tions, predicting task independence. Conversely, demonstra-
tion of a prior in only a single task leaves open the possibility
that the behavioral effects attributed to that prior are instead
caused by idiosyncratic response strategies elicited by the
task and thus the real prior may be different from that assumed
[14, 15]. In order to test the task independence of priors, we
need to compare the priors used in different tasks that operate
on the same stimulus set. To do so requires us to overcome a
major obstacle: the lack of any method for extracting poten-
tially complex, high-dimensional priors for naturalistic stimuli
across different tasks.
Cognitive Tomography
Herewe develop a novel Bayesian approach, cognitive tomog-
raphy, that can be applied to a wide variety of behavioral tasks
by allowing simple discrete choices to be used to reveal
detailed and quantitative information about a subject’s per-
sonal, potentially complex and high-dimensional mental repre-
sentations. The term ‘‘cognitive tomography’’ is motivated by
the isomorphism with traditional structural tomography in
which a detailed high-dimensional physical structure is recon-
structed from a sequence of low-dimensional measurements
(derived from mathematical integrals over the underlying
structure) by solving the ‘‘inverse problem’’ [16]. Analogously,
our method reconstructs an individual subject’s representa-
tional structure using a sequence of simple discrete choices
(arising frommathematical integrals over the underlying struc-
ture) by explicit inversion of a model describing how re-
sponses depend on mental representations.
We start with the idea that objects can be described by
multidimensional features, and a subject’s prior over a class
of objects is a probability distribution over those features
[17, 18]. For example, the feature space we use is based on
the physical appearance of a large sample of human faces
scanned in three dimensions and is constructed along the first
two principal components of their geometrical structure [19].
Figure 1A (top) shows this feature space as well as the prior
of a hypothetical subject plotted in this space: gray scale indi-
cates the probability, according to the subject, with which a
face represented by each location belongs to the class of
familiar faces. To avoid terminological confusion later, we
will refer to a subject’s prior as their ‘‘subjective distribution,’’
and in line with other studies of perceptual priors, we assume
that it affects perceptual decisions without necessarily being
explicitly accessible by the subject. The key element of our
approach is that we explicitly treat the subjective distribution
as an unknown quantity that cannot be observed directly
and thus needs to be inferred from observable behavior. For
this, we use ‘‘ideal observer’’ models that link subjective distri-
butions to behavior, and by inverting these models using
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Figure 1. Cognitive Tomography Applied to Estimating Priors for Faces
(A) Information flow in the ideal observer model. In the model, a subjective distribution,P, encodes prior knowledge about stimuli. In this study, a subjective
distribution for faces assigns a probability value (gray levels) to each face as a function of its location in feature space (here the two dimensions of the feature
space correspond to the first two principal components of the structure of faces [19] and are measured in units of SD). Representative faces corresponding
to the corners of the feature space are shown. The ideal observer infers hypotheses,H, about the stimuli it perceives, S, using prior knowledge encoded inP.
Based on the inferred hypotheses, it computes the final response R. Both perception and decision making are subject to noise and biases, U.
(B) Cognitive tomography inverts the ideal observermodel to computeP based onR and the presented stimuli,S*, which is corrupted by perceptual noise to
yield S. Note that information available to the ideal observer and cognitive tomography (circles with green fill) to compute their final output (blue arrows and
circles) is complementary.
(C) In the familiarity task, participants are presented with a pair of faces (top) and are required to pick the one that they judge more familiar. Each face cor-
responds to a particular location in feature space (colored dots in the bottom panels correspond to stimuli in the top panels). The ideal observer model
makes its choice by considering two hypotheses (bottom; hypothesis 1, face 1 is more familiar than face 2; hypothesis 2, vice versa) that each specify a
way in which the stimuli could have been generated. According to these hypotheses, the familiar face is a sample from the subjective distribution (corrupted
by perceptual noise; colored covariance ellipses), and the unfamiliar face is sampled randomly and uniformly from the feature space (also subject to percep-
tual noise). Given a subjective distribution and the covariance of perceptual noise, the ideal observer assigns a probability to each hypothesis and then
through a decision process (also including noise) determines the probability of each possible response.
(D) In the odd-one-out task, participants are presentedwith three faces and are required to pick the one that looks themost different from the other two (top).
Each hypothesis corresponds to two of the faces being noise-corrupted versions (bottom; pairs of dots enclosed by covariance ellipses) of the same un-
derlying face (centers of ellipses) and the third face (the odd one out) being a noisy version of a truly different face (isolated dots within covariance ellipses,
here shown as circles).
See also Figure S1 for further details and validation of the method.
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subjective distribution.
Ideal observer models formalize subjects’ responses in sim-
ple perceptual decision-making tasks as a two-step process
[21] (Figure 1A; see also the Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures available online). First, the subject performs Bayesian
inference to compute the probability of different hypotheses,H, about how the perceived stimuli, S, may have arisen within
the context of the given task, based on prior knowledge about
these stimuli encoded in their subjective distribution, P. Then,
the subject gives a response based on the probabilities of
these hypotheses, where the decision-making process itself
may also be imperfect such that the subject does not always
produce the response which corresponds to the most
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probability distribution over possible responses, R, given the
presented stimuli, the subjective distribution, and other
parameters of the ideal observer model, U, such as noise
and biases in perception and decision making:
Pideal observerðRjS;P;UÞ: (1)
The essence of our method (Figure 1B) is to use a second
layer of Bayesian inference to invert the ideal observer model
in order to estimate the subjective distribution from the set
of responses the subject gives to the stimuli presented over
the course of an experiment, S*. Due to perceptual noise, the
stimuli perceived by the subject, S, are not exactly the same
as the stimuli they are presented with S*, and the experimenter
only knows (and controls) the latter. Thus, this uncertainty
needs to be taken into account as a probability distribution
over the subject’s perceived stimuli given the presented stim-
uli and noisiness in the subject’s perception, PðSjS*;UÞ. We
place flexible prior distributions over both the subjective distri-
bution, PðPÞ, and the parameters describing perceptual and
decision making noise and biases, PðUÞ. Using Bayes’ rule,
we compute the posterior distribution over possible subjective
distributions by combining these priors with the ideal observer
model as the likelihood (and integrating out the other
parameters):
PðPjR;S*Þf
PðPÞ
Z
dU PðUÞ
Z
dS PðSjS*;UÞ Pideal observerðRjS;P;UÞ:
(2)
Crucially, while the ideal observer is task-specific by defini-
tion, the subjective distribution need not be. Thus, this separa-
tion in our model between these two parts allows us to analyze
behavioral data from different tasks and quantify the relation
between the derived subjective distributions.
We applied cognitive tomography to infer subjective distri-
butions in two different tasks. In one task, subjects had to
decide which of two faces was more familiar (Figure 1C), while
in the other task they were asked to choose which of three
faces was the odd one out (OOO; Figure 1D). Therefore, the re-
quirements in these two tasks were fundamentally different:
the familiarity task explicitly asked subjects to judge each
stimulus in terms of its familiarity, with no requirement to
compare the structure of the two faces, while the OOO task
required subjects to compare the structures of the three faces
to each other, without the need to determine their familiarity.
Importantly, by using ideal observer models, ourmathematical
framework allowed us to treat these tasks in a unified
formalism even though they had different task requirements
and were different at a psychological level.
In the familiarity task, we modeled the ideal observer as
comparing directly the probabilities that the subjective distri-
bution assigned to the two faces and choosing the one with
the higher probability (Figure 1C, the face on the right being
more familiar). Thus, this model does not necessarily imply
that subjects simply judge familiarity based on averageness:
in fact, if the prior is multimodal, or nonconvex (as is the
case in Figure 1A), then its ‘‘average’’ might have low probabil-
ity density and hence our model would predict a low familiarity
rating for it. In order tomake this ideal observermodel concep-
tually consistent with that of the OOO task (see below), we re-
formulated the same decision rule in terms of the ideal
observer comparing the probabilities of different hypothesesabout how the stimuli might have arisen [6, 22]. Each hypoth-
esis posited that one of the faces was a sample from the
subject’s subjective distribution (Figure 1C, dots), with some
potential perceptual noise added (Figure 1C, ellipses), while
the other face came from another distribution (here assumed
to be uniform; see also Figure S1 and the Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures for a decision theoretic rationale).
In the OOO task, our ideal observer model entertained
three hypotheses, each positing that two of the displayed
stimuli were noisy realizations of the same underlying face
which was sampled from the subjective distribution (Fig-
ure 1D, dots within the same elongated ellipse), while the
third, the odd one out, was a noisy realization of another
face, corresponding to another sample from the subjective
distribution. Thus, for stimuli that are equidistant from each
other (as in 90% of trials in our experiment), the three hypo-
theses can only be distinguished using the subjective
distribution. While in general the influence of the subjective
distribution can be complex, one simple intuition is based
on considering the two possible ways in which a subject
can account for any apparent differences when presented
with two stimuli. They either attribute these differences to
just perceptual noise (while assuming that only one object
was sampled from their subjective distribution), and thus
deem the two stimuli to be identical at a fundamental level,
or they assume that the differences between the stimuli are
due to there having been two different objects sampled
from their subjective distribution, and thus that the two stim-
uli are really different. As the two accounts differ in the num-
ber of objects sampled from the subjective distribution (one
or two, respectively), their relative likelihood is scaled by
the probability of the stimuli under the subjective distribution:
the higher this probability is, the more likely the second
account becomes, resulting in a higher propensity to discrim-
inate stimuli that are closer to high probability regions of the
subjective distribution. With three stimuli present, as in our
OOO task, it is one out of such a high probability pair that
will likely be the odd one out (i.e., hypothesis 1 or 2 in Fig-
ure 1D; see also Figure S1).
In both the familiarity and the OOO task, the behavioral
response of the subject was modeled as comparing the prob-
abilities of the different hypotheses and making a choice
based on these probabilities, with noise and biases in the
perceptual and decision making processes so that less prob-
able hypotheses were sometimes chosen. We validated the
method to show that it is able to extract subjective distribu-
tions from such noisy responses and is robust to the choice
of feature space and test stimuli (Figure S1).
Complex, Task-Invariant Subjective Distributions over
Faces
We extracted the subjective distributions of ten subjects who
performed both the familiarity and the OOO task. The sub-
jective distributions were independently estimated in each
subject and in each task. The distributions we found were
complex, often not well described by a single mode, and
varied greatly across subjects (Figures 2 and S2). This varia-
tion across subjects in the familiarity task confirms that
subjects were performing this task by judging familiarity as
intended, with respect to prior experience with faces in the
world rather than based on familiarity with respect to the stim-
ulus distribution presented in the experiment [23]—as unlike
the extracted subjective distributions, the stimulus distribution
was identical across subjects.
Figure 2. Subjective Distributions Inferred from the Two Tasks for the Ten Subjects
Each plot shows the probability (gray levels) over the principal component feature space (64 SD along each dimension as in Figure 1A). Subjects are ordered
according to their consistency score (from high to low), which is a model-free measure of the repeatability of their behavior for identical stimuli. See also
Figure S2 for inferred values of other decision parameters.
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jective distributions were similar between tasks within each
subject. In order to quantify dissimilarities between subjec-
tive distributions, we computed a standard information
theoretic measure of distance between them, the Jensen-
Shannon (JS) divergence. JS divergences between distribu-
tions corresponding to the same subject but to different tasks
were significantly lower than JS divergences between the
distributions of different subjects within each task (Figure 3A,
p = 5 3 1025 and p = 0.047 in the familiarity and OOO
tasks, respectively). Embedding of all subjective distributions
in a two-dimensional space by multidimensional scaling [1]
based on their JS distances also showed that subjective dis-
tributions strongly clustered based on subject and not task
(Figure 3B).
The apparent differences between the estimated priors of
some of our subjects across the two tasks could have arisen
either because priors are truly different or because of random-
ness in subjects’ responding (accounted for in our model by
perceptual and decision noise; Figure S2) that makes the esti-
mation less accurate. However, as we had repeated a fraction
of the trials, we were able to quantify the consistency ofsubjects by measuring the probability that they gave the
same answer to the same stimuli on different occasions [24].
This provided us with an independent model-free measure of
the reliability of subjects. We found that, as expected because
of subjects’ perceptual uncertainty and behavioral stochastic-
ity, consistency scores were far from 100% (familiarity, 0.766
0.04; OOO, 0.62 6 0.05; mean 6 SE). Importantly, the subjec-
tive distributions of the more consistent subjects were also
more similar in the two tasks (Figure 3C, r = 0.69, p = 0.028;
see also Figure 2, in which subjects are ordered from most
to least consistent, and Figure S3). This suggests that within-
subject dissimilarities of estimated subjective distributions
are due to factors not related to the stimuli and the corre-
sponding priors, but to inherent variability in subjects’
responses.
Predicting Behavior Within and Across Tasks
If indeed the subjective distributions we inferred are funda-
mental to subject’s mental representations, then they should
allow us to predict subjects’ responses to novel stimuli. More-
over, if the subjective distributions are truly task independent,
we should be able to predict behavior in one task based on the
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Figure 3. Comparison of Subjective Distributions Across Tasks and Subjects
(A) Jensen-Shannon (JS) distances between subjective distributions inferred in the same subject for the two different tasks (left), inferred in different sub-
jects within the familiarity (middle) and odd-one-out (right) tasks. Dots show individual comparisons (left, subjects; middle and right, subject pairs), boxes
show mean 6 SE. The dashed line shows the estimated lower bound based on the average distance between distributions inferred from two halves of the
data from the same task and same subject. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
(B) Two-dimensional embedding of subjective distributions for the ten subjects and two tasks (symbols) based onmultidimensional scaling applied to all 190
pairwise JS distances. Lines connect distributions of the same subject, and line width is proportional to the consistency score of the subject.
(C) Across-task JS distances for each subject (symbols) against the subject’s task-average consistency score. The regression line shows hyperbolic fit to
data.
Colors for subjects in (B) and (C) are as in Figure 2. See also Figure S3.
Cognitive Tomography
2173subjective distribution we inferred from behavior on the other
task. Figure 4 shows that both within- and across-task predic-
tions (red and pink bars, respectively) are significantly above
chance (dashed line; p = 1.1 3 1025 and p = 4.9 3 1025 for
within- and across-task predictions for the familiarity task
[top row], respectively; p = 2.7 3 1026 and p = 4.8 3 1026 for
within- and across-task predictions for the OOO task [bottom
row], respectively; see also Figure S4). Remarkably, within-
task predictions for the familiarity task are very close to an
expected upper bound that can be computed based on sub-
jects’ consistency [25] (Figures 4E and 4F). Furthermore, the
subjective distributions we extracted from the familiarity task
also provided across-task predictions in the OOO task that
were as accurate as within-task predictions in that task (p =
0.84). This suggests that the familiarity task is an efficient para-
digm for extracting priors which generalize to other tasks
(although it may not be readily applicable to all perceptual do-
mains, such as visual motion).
We used three alternativemodels for predicting subjects’ re-
sponses to validate the results that we obtained by cognitive
tomography. First, the assumption that the two tasks invoked
intrinsically different decision rules was tested through the use
of the same decision rule in the OOO task as in the familiarity
task: simply choosing the most familiar face, or conversely
the least familiar face, as the odd one out. Both of these deci-
sion models had significantly poorer predictive performance
than the original decision model; in fact, their performance
was sometimes close to chance (Figure S4). This confirms
that subjects processed the same set of stimuli in fundamen-
tally different ways in the two tasks.
Second, although the subjective distributions in Figure 2
show a great deal of structural detail, it could be that these
fine details are idiosyncratic and have little relevance for sub-
jects’ behavior. We sought to rule out this possibility by replac-
ing each inferred subjective distribution with a distribution that
lacked these fine structural details but had the samemean and
covariance (a single moment-matched Gaussian). If the struc-
tural details of the distribution we inferred were idiosyncratic,
then predictions based on the simplified ‘‘moment-matched’’
distributions should be as good as those based on the inferred
distributions. However, taking into account the originallyinferred subjective distributions led to significantly better
predictions than using the moment-matched distributions
(Figures 4C and 4D, blue bars; p = 0.0056 and p = 0.025 in
the familiarity andOOO tasks, respectively; see also FigureS4).
This shows that the details of the subjective distributions re-
vealed by our inference algorithm, which go beyond simple
means and covariances, rather than being artifactual have
true behavioral relevance.
Third, to test whether predicting subjects’ responses bene-
fits from assuming that there is a task-independent compo-
nent of their mental representation, we predicted responses
using a Gaussian process (GP) classifier that is a state-of-
the-art learning algorithm that has no notion of subjective dis-
tributions and is optimized directly for within-task prediction.
Nevertheless, our method outperforms the GP classifier
(Figure 4C and 4D, green bars; p = 0.023 and p = 0.076 in the
familiarity and OOO tasks, respectively; see also Figure S4).
Importantly, the GP classifier directly fits subjects’ stimulus-
to-response mappings without extracting underlying subjec-
tive distributions and thus has no way to provide across-task
predictions. In contrast, in the OOO task, even our across-
task predictions are as good as (even marginally better, p =
0.092, than) the within-task predictions of the GP classifier
algorithm.
Discussion
Previous methods aimed at extracting mental representations
were limited because they were constrained to be used with
only one particular task [1–10]. For example, multidimensional
scaling can be used to construct a psychological space in
which the proximity of individual stimuli is determined by the
subject’s similarity judgments (akin to the judgments subjects
needed to make in our OOO task) [1], but it is unclear how this
space could be useful to process or predict familiarity judg-
ments about the same stimuli. Similarly, reverse correlation
methods can be used to extract a classification image in a
task that essentially requires familiarity judgments [7, 25],
but such a classification image only provides information
about the mean or mode of the prior [26] and thus remains un-
informative about the rich structural details of the priors we
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Figure 4. Predicting Subjects’ Responses Within and Across Task with Different Models
(A and B) Individual subjects. Performance of cognitive tomography is shown for within-task (red) and across-task predictions that is using subjective dis-
tributions inferred from one task to predict behavior in the other task (pink). The dashed line shows chance performance. Subjects are ordered by their
average consistency on the two tasks (as in Figure 2).
(C and D) Group averages (mean 6 SE) comparing cognitive tomography (red and pink bars) to alternative predictors. Replacement of subjective distribu-
tions with moment-matched Gaussians, thus ignoring the fine structural details of the subjective distributions, decreases performance (dark blue, within
task; light blue, across task). A Gaussian process (GP) classifier that is directly optimized to fit subjects’ stimulus-to-response mappings without assuming
the existence of subjective distributions also performs worse and is unable to generalize across tasks (green bars). (*)p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
(E and F)Within-task predictive performance of cognitive tomography for each subject (symbols color coded as in Figure 2) against their consistency levels.
Boundary of gray shaded area shows expected upper bound on the performance of any predictor as a function of consistency. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence intervals.
See also Figure S4 for a more detailed analysis of predictive performance.
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classification image could be relevant to similarity judgments
in tasks such as our OOO task, especially given that we have
shown familiarity not to be directly predictive of behavior in
the OOO task. In contrast, our method extracts detailed sub-
jective distributions over multidimensional feature spaces in
away that it can be usedwith essentially any task type in which
performance depends on these distributions.
The priors we extracted were strikingly different across sub-
jects but invariant across tasks. The distinct subject specificity
of the priors for faces we found is in contrast with lower-level
sensory priors which have been found to be more similar
across subjects [3]. However, even such lower-level priors,
for example those over the direction of illumination [13] and
the speed of visual motion [23], have been shown to be plastic
to experience. Thus, the difference between our subjects’
priors over faces may in part reflect their different personal
experiences with faces, possibly relating to their geographical
and cultural backgrounds. Personal experiences for lower-
level features can be expected to be more uniform, which
could account for the similarity of the priors for such features
across subjects in other studies.
The issue of task invariance is also important because task-
specific and -independent representations map onto two
fundamental mechanisms of learning: discriminative and
generative. In discriminative learning, one learns the mapping
from stimuli to responses directly for each task with the aim of
optimizing task performance. Thus, discriminative learning is
solely tailored to improve performance in each specific task
separately. In contrast, in generative learning, one learns the
probability of experiencing different stimuli irrespective ofthe task. This task-independent representation can then be
used to generate different stimulus-response mappings de-
pending on task demands. Classical theories of learning sug-
gest that task-independent representations, arising through
generative learning, are beneficial when the range of tasks is
wide, and hard to prespecify. For example, generative repre-
sentations of low-level perceptual features such as edges in
visual scenes account well for neural and behavioral data
[27–29]. In particular, behavior in tasks that only rely on such
low-level features has been shown to use different readout
mechanisms operating on representations that are shared
across tasks [30]. However, when the set of required tasks is
limited or is well known a priori, task-specific representations,
brought about by discriminative learning, would be beneficial
[31]. For example, discriminative learning would be expected
for high-level tasks such as object recognition and categoriza-
tion [32–35]. This theoretical distinction makes our results of
task-independent representations of human faces particularly
unexpected because this is a domain in which there is a set of
naturally required tasks (such as familiarity, categorization,
and outlier detection) for which learning might be expected
to be specialized. Therefore, one might expect that other rep-
resentations, for which the human brainmay have less special-
ized circuitry [36, 37], will also be task independent.
Our results thus suggest that there should be a common
neural underpinning of a subject’s priors employed across
several tasks. This is not a conclusion that could have been
easily achieved through neuronal recordings fromhigher-order
cortical areas because it would require inverting a model that
defines how these subjective distributions are reflected in neu-
ral activity. While there are well-established ideal observer
Cognitive Tomography
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subjects’ behavior, there is no comparable understanding of
howcomplex,multidimensional priors are reflected in neuronal
firing [11, 38]. However, our cognitive tomography method is
directly applicable to search for such neural correlates as it
provides a method for computing an independent, purely
behavior-based regressor for techniques such as functional
imaging and neurophysiology. Moreover, our method can be
readily generalized beyond the domain of perception, for
example, to estimate conceptually abstract priors such as
over moral beliefs by modeling subjects’ responses to ques-
tionnaires using ideal observer models derived from item
response theory [39]. Thus, in combination with neural
recording techniques, our work opens the way to the study of
the neural underpinning of even such abstract priors.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and four figures and can be foundwith this article online at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.cub.2013.09.012.
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